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Abstract
In the social and cognitive sciences, crowdsourcing provides up to half of all research partic-
ipants. Despite this popularity, researchers typically do not conceptualize participants accu-
rately, as gig-economy worker-participants. Applying theories of employee motivation and
the psychological contract between employees and employers, we hypothesized that pay
and pay raises would drive worker-participant satisfaction, performance, and retention in a
longitudinal study. In an experiment hiring 359 Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers, we found
that initial pay, relative increase of pay over time, and overall pay did not have substantial
influence on subsequent performance. However, pay significantly predicted participants’
perceived choice, justice perceptions, and attrition. Given this, we conclude that worker-par-
ticipants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, having relatively low power to negotiate
pay. Results of this study suggest that researchers wishing to crowdsource research partici-
pants using MTurk might not face practical dangers such as decreased performance as a
result of lower pay, but they must recognize an ethical obligation to treat Workers fairly.
Introduction
In the social and cognitive sciences, crowdsourcing [1] provides up to half of all research par-
ticipants [2] and is growing in popularity, with Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) as a domi-
nant source [3]. For researchers, crowdsourcing has provided access to a large, diverse, and
convenient pool of participants. Referred to by Amazon as Workers, we conceptualize these
individuals as “worker-participants” based on their self-identification as workers and their role
as research participants. Past research suggests that although the characteristics of individuals
participating in crowdsourcing may be somewhat idiosyncratic, these differences do not gen-
erally threaten the conclusions of studies, with some exceptions (e.g., nonnaiveté; [1,4,5]).
As platforms such as MTurk reach maturity, the dual goals of ensuring scientific validity
and protecting worker-participants’ rights must both be met. Past research in this area has
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focused almost exclusively on questions of issues of generalizability and representativeness in
relation to other samples (e.g. [4,5]) but has not generally considered the ethical and practical
implications of sampling from a population of gig-economy contract workers versus more tra-
ditional populations.
MTurk Workers share common characteristics with other paid research participants and
may be conceptualized as professional subjects whose participation in academic research is
solely to generate income. Previous research has examined unique behaviors of professional
subjects such as deception in screening questionnaires to ensure selection for participation [6].
The MTurk Worker population is comprised of both professional research subjects and indi-
viduals who engage in various other Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) outside of academic
research (e.g., editing a computer-generated transcription of an audio file). They have made
efforts to self-identify as contract employees and publicize their expectations of the Worker-
Requester relationship in addition to other behaviors that indicate a nontraditional work envi-
ronment with characteristics of both professional subjects and gig contract workers in an
employment setting.
All academic research is bound by an ethical code that is concerned with protecting the
rights of human subjects, explicated in guidelines such as the Belmont Report and enforced by
the review boards of academic institutions and other governing bodies [7]. However, it is
important to consider the ways in which crowdsourced research conducted through online
platforms has implications for both general research ethics and gig work. MTurk provides a
unique population of independent contractors with aspects that differentiate it from other
types of research participants and other types of employees, which can provide novel and use-
ful information for both groups. MTurk allows Workers to explicitly sign up for a marketplace
with the opportunity to complete tasks for pay at their own discretion. This exerts a certain
market pressure on Workers that is analogous to traditional labor halls for union members
seen in the industrial era [8,9]. This labor model has also seen a renaissance with day laborers
in the agriculture and logistics industries [10]. This analogy can be applied to many online
marketplaces such as Prolific, Upwork, and Fiver; however, we have chosen MTurk for this
study based on its’ prevalent usage for social science research and the researchers’ direct pay-
ment of participants. Other types of online research panels obtain participants from many dif-
ferent sources with varying types of rewards or compensation (e.g., game tokens and points
toward gift cards) that does not typically align with the labor hall model. In these cases,
researchers may not have direct knowledge of type and level of participant incentives, but
instead pay the crowdsourcing platform for the collection of a panel. This type of compensa-
tion has more definitive ethical violations than the nuances afforded by the labor market cre-
ated on the MTurk platform. Thus, MTurk represents a unique subset of research participants
that are also gig economy workers. This conceptualization necessarily benefits from previous
research on work motivation, behavior and attitudes.
The work motivation literature [11] suggests that of the many relevant factors that may
determine motivation, pay and expectations about pay stand out as especially relevant. Locke,
Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, and Denny [12] argued, “No other incentive or motivational technique
comes even close to money with respect to its instrumental value” (p. 379). Thus, we seek to
understand the effect of pay on crowdsourced worker-participant behavior. We focused on the
special case of a longitudinal study in which participants must return on a separate occasion to
explore how pay affects worker-participant performance (i.e., data quality), satisfaction, and
attrition.
Since the creation of MTurk in 2007, researchers have explored how pay influences behav-
ior in crowdsourced work marketplaces. In an early study, Buhrmester et al. [3] found that rel-
atively higher pay rates (50 cents vs 5 cents) resulted in faster overall data collection time, with
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no major differences in data quality as assessed by scale reliability. Litman, Robinson, and
Rosenzweig [13] found that monetary compensation was the highest-rated motivation for
completing a research study among US-based Workers, contrary to findings just four years
prior [3]. A recent poll found that on average MTurk Workers estimated fair payment hovered
just above the United States minimum wage ($7.25/hr), up from the previous standard of $6/
hr [14]. The MTurk community is evolving over time, and the norms and expectations for pay
have changed, with new tools constantly emerging to meet Workers’ demands for fair pay
(e.g., Turkopticon, TurkerView).
As Workers develop more employee-like identities, we argue that they follow patterns expli-
cated in pay-for-performance theory [15]. Pay predicts a number of goal-directed behaviors
because it supports physiological and safety needs [16]. Classic studies have found that pay for
performance leads employees to increased productivity [12,17]. Aligned with this evidence on
the extrinsic motivation provided by pay, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Base pay, pay increases, and total pay positively affect the performance of
worker-participants as measured by indicators of data quality.
Although pay is often critical to work motivation, meta-analytic findings suggest that in tra-
ditional forms of work, pay is only slightly related to job satisfaction [18] and performance [19].
In short, pay might encourage worker-participants to exert just enough effort to be compen-
sated and no more. Compensation is better considered a multifaceted issue in which the level of
compensation matters, but so too do worker-participants’ expectations and their understanding
of their compensation. In most organizations, many aspects of the employment relationship are
left unstated, yet form a psychological contract between the employee and employer [20–22].
Each party, the employee and employer, holds beliefs about what they expect from the other
and what they are obligated to provide in return [22]. Contractual beliefs come in part from
schema, norms, and past experiences [21]. When the employer and employee hold mutual
beliefs, effective performance, feelings of trust and commitment, and reciprocity follow [22].
This contract is an important framework within which to understand compensation.
The development of psychological contracts also has major implications for perceived orga-
nizational justice. Specifically, distributive justice [23] which focuses on the perceptions of
decision outcomes in an organization or group, has been previously applied to compensation
fairness [24,25]. Typically, distributive justice is cultivated when these outcomes are aligned
with norms for the allocation of rewards (i.e., equity and fair pay for good performance) [26].
Especially relevant for research participants, this concept also has roots in research ethics (see
the Belmont Report; [7]).
As the norms of MTurk evolve, the expectations and the psychological contract between
Workers and Requesters (i.e., those providing tasks to complete) also change. In early days,
Workers did not have strong prior experience to draw from in forming expectations. Now, as
a mature system, Workers have strong beliefs and have formed expectations of their employ-
ers. By examining websites such as Turkopticon, where MTurk users report violations of their
self-formed Bill of Rights, it becomes clear that Workers are not traditional paid participants
[27]. Among these expectations are fair pay equivalent to US minimum wage, swift payment
for good work, and bonuses for outstanding work [28]. To address these motivational aspects
of crowdsourced research, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Base pay, pay raises, and total pay positively affect worker-participant satis-
faction as measured by intrinsic motivation, compensation reactions, and distributive
justice.
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As in any other workplace, trust and credibility are essential in determining whether a
worker-participant will return to complete additional work. Attrition in traditional employ-
ment settings can often be attributed to dissatisfaction, depending on an employee’s job
embeddedness, agency, or commitment [29–31]. Absolute pay level is also related to turnover
[32], although pay raises have been demonstrated to be more important in determining both
turnover and fairness perceptions [19]. The crowdsourcing environment is unusual compared
to other forms of work, however, in that worker-participants have less obvious opportunities
to interact with each other, reducing their likelihood of forming bonds that drive retention
decisions unless they seek out online communities built for that purpose. Further, the physical
environment is not fixed, removing concerns such as location and community in determining
retention. Thus, in the specific context of longitudinal crowdsourced work, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: Base pay, pay increases, and total pay negatively affect attrition of worker-
participants.
Method
This study was approved and monitored by the Institutional Review Board of Old Dominion
University (Reference number: 15–183).
Participants
Participants (N = 359) were adult users of MTurk located in the United States. One participant
completed more than one condition and was removed from the data set. 50% of participants
identified as female, 70% identified as White, 6% as African American, 14% as Asian Ameri-
can, 1.7% as Native American or Native Alaskan and 9.2% identified as “other.” 63% of partici-
pants reported working full-time, 16% reported working part-time and 21% were
unemployed. Of those employed, about 20% were employed in business service, 12% in educa-
tion, 12% in finance, 8% in healthcare, 10% in manufacturing, and 10% in retail. There were
minimal differences in demographics between the initial sample and the retained sample in
the second wave of the study (Table 1).
Design
We used a 3x3 between-subjects design in which the manipulated factors were Time 1 (T1)
Pay (X1: $.50, $1, $2) and Pay Multiplier (X2: 100%, 200%, 400%) which represented a relative
pay increase at Time 2 (T2). Thus, worker-participants who completed both waves of the study
were paid anywhere between $1 and $10 total, and this total pay represents the interaction
between X1 and X2. See Table 2 for a closer examination of each cell of the experimental
design in addition to the observed hourly wage based on average completion time in each con-
dition. To control for time of day effects and potential time-zone availability differences, each
condition was split into two halves, which were deployed at either 12:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. EST.
The T2 follow up for each wave was matched to the T1 day and time. The groups were made
available sequentially, every 3–4 days, from January 11 to May 13. The T1 waves were each
open for 12 hours, and the T2 waves were open for up to 6 weeks. The T2 deployments were
accompanied by a reminder email.
Procedure
Participants first viewed a recruitment notice for the task on Amazon’s MTurk and self-
selected to participate. The recruitment notice included the time-to-completion estimate (30
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minutes), compensation for both the current task and the follow-up, and information about
the second questionnaire invitation to follow in approximately 30 days. This information was
also repeated in the consent script upon acceptance of the Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on
the MTurk platform. Each condition received HIT recruitment notices and consent scripts
specific to their experimental manipulation. Participants gave informed consent by clicking
“YES” on a consent script before proceeding to the experiment. Participants who accepted the
terms were directed to complete the questionnaire containing all measures. They had 12 hours
to complete the survey and were told that their choice to participate in the second part of the
study would not affect their payment for part one. The last page of the questionnaire contained
Table 1. Demographics by retained status.
Total Sample (T1) Retained Sample (T2)
Gender
Male 50% 179 48% 72
Female 50% 180 52% 79
Race
Black 6% 21 7% 11
Asian 14% 49 19% 28
White 70% 250 61% 92
Other 9% 32 11% 17
Two or More 2% 7 2% 3
Employment Status
Full time 63% 226 70% 106
Part time 16% 57 15% 22
Not employed 21% 76 15% 23
Master Worker Status
Yes 13% 48 13% 20
No 87% 311 87% 131
Total N 359 151
�p < .05. ��p < .01. ���p < .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460.t001
Table 2. N, Pay, average completion time, and observed hourly wage by experimental condition.
T1 N T2 N Retention Rate T1 Pay T2 Pay Total Pay T1 Average Completion Timea T2 Average Completion Timea Observed Hourly Wageb
40 7 0.18 $0.50 $0.50 $1.00 28.66 25.47 $1.11
40 10 0.25 $0.50 $1.00 $1.50 26.74 24.52 $1.76
40 20 0.50 $0.50 $2.00 $2.50 33.09 23.06 $2.67
40 14 0.35 $1.00 $1.00 $2.00 23.66 26.09 $2.41
39 15 0.38 $1.00 $2.00 $3.00 34.73 35.49 $2.56
40 22 0.55 $1.00 $4.00 $5.00 30.38 24.69 $5.45
40 18 0.45 $2.00 $2.00 $4.00 38.52 37.75 $3.15
40 17 0.43 $2.00 $4.00 $6.00 34.18 28.40 $5.75
40 28 0.70 $2.00 $8.00 $10.00 30.73 27.72 $10.27
Total 359 151 0.42
Note
ain minutes
bObserved Hourly Wage = (Total Pay/(T1 Average Completion Time + T2 Average Completion Time))�60.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460.t002
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a unique ID to submit for payment. Six weeks later, participants were emailed with a direct
invitation to participate at Time 2. Participant contact was managed within the MTurk plat-
form. Minimal identifiable information was collected (demographics and MTurk ID for pay-
ment), and no attempts were made to re-identify individuals based on their unique MTurk ID.
If the participant accepted the invitation to the second wave, they were directed to an identical
survey and followed an initial set of procedures. After the study was completed for all partici-
pants, debriefing documentation was emailed to all participants.
Measures
As the core “work”, worker-participants completed a HIT (Human Intelligence Task; a piece
of work offered on the MTurk platform) comprised of a series of well-validated cognitive and
personality instruments. These included a ten-item Big 5 personality measure [33], a positive
and negative affectivity questionnaire [34], a 30-item cognitive ability test [35], a personal
altruism questionnaire [36], the Neutral Objects Satisfaction Questionnaire (NOSQ; [37]), and
an Adult Decision-making competency questionnaire [38]. Post-work attitude measures
included compensation reactions, intrinsic motivation [39], and distributive justice [26]. The
above measures served both as a combination of outcome variables in their own right, and a
means to assess data quality and reliability.
Performance was operationalized in several ways. The first indicator of performance was
the number of attention check items answered correctly at each wave. Both instructed items
and bogus items were used [40]. For example, participants were asked to “Select the option
that is at the left end of the scale for this question.” (see [41]). Ostensibly, anyone answering
questions arbitrarily would miss some of these items. Each wave contained five attention
checks. Second, personal reliability (test-retest) for two scales, personality and cognitive ability,
was calculated, such that higher reliability indicated better performance [3]. Third, following
recommendations from Meade & Craig [41] maximum and average LongString values were
calculated representing the maximum and average number of identical responses in a row,
respectively. LongString values were calculated using all non-outcome scales that would permit
long-string responses including the big five personality, affect, personal altruism, and neutral
objects questionnaires.
Motivation was measured using three subscales from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory
[39], including the Interest/Enjoyment Subscale (e.g., “I enjoyed doing this HIT very much”; α
= .79) along with Perceived Effort/Importance (e.g., “I put a lot of effort into this.”; α = .81),
and Perceived Choice (“I believe I had some choice about doing this HIT.”; α = .82).
Satisfaction with compensation was measured with two separate items regarding the cur-
rent task (e.g., “I am satisfied with the overall pay I will receive for this HIT”) and overall com-
pensation for both tasks (e.g., “I am satisfied with the overall pay I will receive for these two
HITs.”) and four items from Colquitt’s [26] distributive justice scale (e.g., “Does your compen-
sation reflect the effort you have put into your work?”; α = .86).
Retention was operationalized as successful completion of the second wave of the study.
Manipulation checks of the experimental conditions occurred in both waves of the study.
Participants were asked to confirm how much money they were paid for each wave in addition
to stating whether they knew this was the first or second wave of a two-part study.
Results
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all variables are in Table 3. For this study,
manipulation checks served their typical purpose of flagging insufficient effort responding;
this also served as one test of the effect of experimental conditions on performance [40].
PLOS ONE Pay for performance, satisfaction and retention in longitudinal crowdsourced research
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Approximately 90% of participants correctly reported how much money they were paid for
the first wave, 94% indicated that they were aware they were taking the first part of a two-part
study, and 96% indicated that they intended to complete the second part of the study. Seventy-
seven percent of participants correctly identified how much they were paid in wave two and
93% indicated that they were aware they were taking the second part of a two-part study.
Although, there is not a clear pattern explaining the noticeable drop in correct pay identifica-
tion in the second wave, there are a number of possible explanations including careless
responding and confusion about total pay as opposed to current wave pay. Additionally,
Workers often sort HITs based on pay and once they have reached a personal threshold, may
not remember the exact pay for each HIT they accept. Based on the research questions being
addressed in our study, retaining those individuals who did not pass the manipulation checks
for the final analysis made our sample more representative of the typical MTurk population.
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Note: SE = Standard error
a results from Poisson regression
b Time 1 Pay treated as factor for this analysis; coefficients represent the effect in comparison to the referent group of
(T1 pay = $.50).
c Pay increase treated as factor for this analysis; coefficients represent the effect in comparison to the referent group
of (T2 increase = 100%).
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: 
All hypotheses were tested using regression with appropriate considerations for dispersion
(e.g., linear, Poisson, and logistic regression). Independent variables (including the interaction
term) were dummy-coded. As in any multiple regression, coefficients should be interpreted as
the effect conditional on all other variables in the model being held at zero. Given the dummy
coding, holding variables at zero results in an estimated effect compared to the referent group
where T1 Pay = $.50 and Pay Multiplier = 100% (see table notes and [42] for more details on
interpreting dummy-variable regression models). These coefficients are not an exact replica-
tion of an ANOVA framework. For this reason, regression results are presented in addition to
analysis of variance or analysis of deviance tables where appropriate.
Analyses are presented for both Time 1 and Time 2 outcome measures of performance and
satisfaction. As was expected and used to test H3, only a portion of participants were retained
at Time 2. Given this, some cell sizes at Time 2 across conditions are quite low, possibly result-
ing in reduced power to detect significant effects. Differences in significant effects between
Time 1 and Time 2 may not be exclusively attributed to study variables and should be inter-
preted with the influence of this fact in mind.
H1 predicted that pay would positively affect worker-participant performance. The effect of
pay on passed attention checks was tested using two modeling approaches, one cross-sectional
and the other longitudinal. In the first model, using Poisson regression, number of passed
Attention Checks at T1 was regressed on to T1 Pay, Pay Multiplier, and the interaction (Total
Pay). Neither T1 Pay or Pay Multiplier significantly predicted the number of Passed Attention
Checks at T1. In the second model, only including participants who completed both waves,
Attention Checks passed at T2 was regressed on to T1 Pay, Pay Multiplier, and the interaction
(Total Pay; Tables 4 and 5). There were no significant effects of pay on performance in the sec-
ond wave of the study. The effect of pay on personal reliability, using both personality and gen-
eral mental ability responses, was tested by regressing Personal Reliability scores on T1 Pay,
Pay Multiplier, and the interaction (Total Pay; Tables 4 and 6, Fig 1). There was a significant
effect of T1 Pay on Personality Personal Reliability scores, but not General Mental Ability.
Generally, as T1 Pay increased, Personality Personal Reliability scores increased. Lastly, the
effect of pay on Maximum and Average LongString values was tested (Tables 4–6, Fig 1). Total
Pay had a significant effect on Maximum LongString at T1, although there was no interpret-
able pattern based on condition. Pay did not have a significant effect on Average LongString at
T1 or T2 and did not have a significant effect on Maximum LongString at T2. To summarize,
Table 5. Analysis of deviance for poisson models of effect of pay on performance.
Passed Attention Checks Insufficient Effort—Maximum Count LongString























Df Deviance χ2 p
value
Null 358 141.82 150 72.25 358 754.23 150 341.49
Pay T1 356 139.40 2 2.42 0.299 148 69.13 2 3.12 0.210 356 751.78 2 2.48 0.294 148 338.97 2 2.51 0.284
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across the indicators of performance, there was no convincing evidence that initial pay or pay
multiplier significantly affected data quality; H1 was not supported.
H2 predicted that pay would positively affect worker-participant satisfaction measured by
post-test intrinsic motivation, compensation reactions, and distributive justice perceptions.
Scores of each T1 satisfaction measure were regressed onto initial Pay, Pay Multiplier, and
Total Pay (Tables 7 and 8, Fig 2). There were no significant effects of Pay on Enjoyment or
Table 6. Analysis of variance for effect of pay on performance.
Personal Reliability Insufficient Effort—Average LongString
Personality Cognitive Ability T1 T2
Source Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F
Pay T1 2 1.69 0.85 8.40��� 2 0.97 0.48 4.74� 2 2.17 1.09 0.26 2 5.64 2.82 0.51
Pay Increase 2 0.15 0.08 0.76 2 0.25 0.12 1.22 2 5.22 2.61 0.64 2 9.84 4.92 0.89
Pay T1 x Pay Increase 4 0.25 0.06 0.62 4 0.46 0.11 1.11 4 20.69 5.17 1.26 4 11.31 2.83 0.51





Fig 1. Data quality indicators by experimental pay condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460.g001
PLOS ONE Pay for performance, satisfaction and retention in longitudinal crowdsourced research































X i 2.5 
0.0 
Cognitive Ability Personal Reliability 
.5 2 
Time 1 Pay and Pay Increase 
Max Longstring Length - Time 1 
.5 2 .5 1 2 .5 



























X i 2.5 
0.0 
Personality Personal Reliability 
.5 2 .5 
Time 1 Pay and Pay Increase 
Max Longstring Length - Time 2 
.5 2 .5 1 2 .5 
Time 1 Pay and Pay Increase 
Table 7. Regression results for the effect of pay on worker-participant satisfaction and retention.
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(.67)
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(.61)�
.33 (.26) -.07 (.44) .48
(.24)�
.21 (.46) .18 (.25) -.38 (.45) .93 (.53)
Pay T1 ($2)b .28 (.32) -0.05
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.32 (.31) -.10 (.61) -.20 (.37) -1.25
(.81)
.27 (.37) .37 (.59) -.02 (.34) .05 (.61) .43 (.35) .85 (.60) -.30 (.72)
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(.73)��
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.35 (.53) -.68 (.35) .86 (.52) -.50 (.70)
Model R2 .03 .10 .02� .07 .07� .16� .07�� .19��� .13��� .18��� .05� .14� .069d
Note: SE = Standard error
a results from logistic regression
b Time 1 Pay treated as factor for this analysis; coefficients represent the effect in comparison to the referent group of (T1 pay = $.50).





Table 8. Analysis of variance for effect of pay on worker satisfaction.
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory
Enjoyment T1 Enjoyment T2 Effort T1 Effort T2 Perceived Choice T1 Perceived Choice T2
Source Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F
Pay T1 2 1.89 0.94 0.45 2 6.65 3.32 1.57 2 2.55 1.27 1.30 2 4.20 2.10 2.11 2 19.84 9.92 7.32��� 2 25.51 12.75 7.42���
Pay Increase 2 5.42 2.71 1.29 2 14.15 7.07 3.33� 2 0.26 0.13 0.13 2 3.91 1.95 1.97 2 12.22 6.11 4.50� 2 4.66 2.33 1.35
Pay T1 x Pay Increase 4 11.78 2.95 1.40 4 12.59 3.15 1.48 4 2.57 0.64 0.66 4 2.00 0.50 0.50 4 1.96 0.49 0.36 4 17.04 4.26 2.48�
Residuals 350 737.52 2.11 142 301.36 2.12 349 341.04 0.98 141 139.87 0.99 350 474.72 1.36 142 244.00 1.72
Compensation Reactions Distributive Justice
Current Wave T1 Current Wave T2 Both Waves T1 Both Waves T2 T1 T2
Source Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F
Pay T1 2 13.89 6.94 5.17�� 2 9.34 4.67 5.08�� 2 19.86 9.93 8.88��� 2 11.26 5.63 5.67�� 2 12.54 6.27 5.14�� 2 6.59 3.29 3.51�
Pay Increase 2 2.58 1.29 0.96 2 19.32 9.66 10.52��� 2 29.10 14.55 13.02��� 2 19.70 9.85 9.92��� 2 2.50 1.25 1.02 2 9.64 4.82 5.14��
Pay T1 x Pay Increase 4 19.71 4.93 3.67�� 4 1.48 0.37 0.40 4 8.76 2.19 1.96 4 0.75 0.19 0.19 4 8.74 2.18 1.79 4 4.64 1.16 1.24
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Perceived Effort. There was a significant positive effect of T1 Pay and Pay Multiplier on Per-
ceived Choice. There was also a significant effect of Total Pay on Compensation Reactions at
T1. Participants initially receiving $0.50 with no increase (100% multiplier) in the second wave
had the lowest compensation reactions, while any participant making a total of at least $3.00
generally scored highest. T1 Pay had a significant effect on T1 Distributive Justice with those
initially receiving $2 scoring highest. A second regression was conducted for participants with
scores on each T2 satisfaction measure (Tables 7 and 8, Fig 2). Again, there were no significant
effects of pay on Enjoyment or Perceived Effort. Total Pay did, however, significantly predict
Perceived Choice at T2. Of those receiving the largest increase in pay (400% multiplier), partic-
ipants receiving an initial pay of $1 scored the lowest on Perceived Choice, but overall the low-
est total pay of $1 resulted in the least perceived choice. Pay did not predict Compensation
Reactions at T2. Total Pay positively affected Distributive Justice at T2. H2 was partially
supported.
H3 predicted a negative effect of pay on attrition. We used a logistic regression model,
where the binary outcome of Completion was regressed on to pay (Tables 7 and 9, Fig 2). T1
Pay and Pay Multiplier significantly predicted whether a participant completed the second sur-
vey such that those with higher T1 Pay and a larger Pay Multiplier were more likely to com-
plete the survey at T2. H3 was supported.
Fig 2. Significant effects for satisfaction and retention by experimental pay condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460.g002
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The scientific community has expressed both excitement and skepticism about the value of
MTurk Workers as a population. The purpose of this study was to explore whether pay was a
motivator for Workers, specifically in a longitudinal study. Findings showed that pay mattered
for satisfaction and attrition but not performance. The norms of MTurk exert significant pres-
sure on Workers to do a “good job” regardless of their satisfaction, because they risk rejection
of their work if their performance is not acceptable. Thus, if a Worker submits a task, it is
probable that the task will be of high quality regardless of pay level or Worker satisfaction,
even at very low pay rates. On the other hand, low pay will likely lead to a penalty to the
Requester’s reputation. Regardless of acceptable data quality in an initial HIT, decreased satis-
faction and increased attrition are likely to jeopardize future data collection efforts (especially
for longitudinal studies) and undermine the success of the MTurk platform for researchers.
Further, it is unethical. MTurk Workers view themselves as employees who are entitled to fair
pay, generally US minimum wage. A Worker’s average compensation was only US$1.38 per
hour in 2010 [43]. Little progress has been made here as recent research estimates the median
hourly wage (taking into account the influence of unpaid work such as time spent searching
for HITs or work on HITs that are ultimately rejected) is about US$2 per hour with only four
percent earning more than US$7.25 per hour [44].
In the special case of multi-wave studies, the scope of the current study, it appears that
worker-participants generally do not take the average of the two pay rates in determining fair-
ness during the first wave. With the exception of initial participant satisfaction in the first wave
and distributive justice at T2, there were few significant effects of the combination of pay
increase and T1 pay on satisfaction, performance, retention or data quality. Rather, participant
performance, satisfaction, and retention as well as the quality of their work all depend on the
initial T1 pay. Lower initial pay generally resulted in worse outcomes. Participant satisfaction
with compensation across both waves was dependent on the pay increase; participants were
more satisfied with their compensation when their pay increase was steeper. Pay increase also
affected retention and perceptions of justice in the second wave of the study.
There was mixed support that initial pay affects performance/data quality. Generally, data
quality was not affected by pay. Personal reliability across personality measures did seem to
increase as T1 pay increased, and maximum LongString was affected by total pay. However,
data quality and performance did not seem to be affected by initial pay, pay increase, or total
pay. Researchers’ concerns that MTurk Workers are only participating for the money may ini-
tially be warranted, but when considering longitudinal research other factors may be more
important.
Table 9. Analysis of deviance for logistic model of effect of pay on retention.
Retention
Residual Df Residual Deviance Df Deviance χ2 p value
Null 358 488.59
Pay T1 356 476.85 2 11.74 0.003���
Pay Increase 354 456.43 2 20.42 0.000���
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As expected, compensation reactions and distributive justice perceptions at T1 are typically
related to T1 pay. Pay does not necessarily offer much intrinsic motivation, but participants do
report more perceived choice as a function of pay. A decrease in perceived choice in T2 was
possibly related to individuals with higher perceived choice in T1 exercising this choice and
not returning for the second wave. Paired with the performance findings, this suggests that
Workers are in a social context in which they have a certain level of choice over which HITs to
accept (based on pay), but that after engaging in an unofficial contract with a Requester, their
level of effort and the resulting performance do not change as a function of pay.
We took a similar approach to explaining our findings for the relationship between pay and
satisfaction as Judge and colleagues [18] in their landmark meta-analysis of pay satisfaction.
Helson’s [45] adaptation level theory suggests that individuals judge their current experiences
based on a reference point that is adjusted as a function of previous experiences and contextual
stimuli. As such, a pay increase may influence this reference point and lose its value over time.
Similarly, Lucas et al. [46] discuss the effect of hedonic leveling whereby individual well-being
stabilizes over time such that positive events affect those whose lives are already satisfying less
than those with poor well-being. Based on this rationale, it would be expected that high pay
would be most satisfying for individuals, like MTurk Workers, who have historically been
underpaid for their work in addition to those who receive large pay increases over time after
initial lower pay.
T1 pay and T2 pay multiplier significantly predicted retention, but there was not a signifi-
cant interaction between the two. MTurk Workers may recognize T1 pay as an initial hurdle
to participation, but after completing T1 tasks, they renegotiate their psychological contract
about the value of participation relative to the time costs associated with returning for T2.
Here, a higher pay increase represents a recognition from the Requester that the Workers’
time is valuable.
The current study makes a major contribution to current discussion surrounding ethical
treatment of MTurk Workers by applying psychological principles of work motivation, psy-
chological contracts, and pay. The findings are generally applicable to a new kind of virtual
work environment similar to traditional labor halls of the industrial revolution. However, the
inferences made based on these findings have three limitations which may offer guidance for
future research in this area.
As a first limitation, by nature, the current study does not allow us to infer the psychological
and motivational characteristics of those MTurk Workers who did not accept the HIT. Though
non-respondents are admittedly a blind spot in any social science research, it is particularly
important for this study because it indicates a possible preferred threshold for initial pay level.
The MTurk platform allows Workers to sort and filter HITs based on pay, thus non-respon-
dents for this study include those who never saw the HIT due to pay and those who outright
chose not to complete it after previewing the task and comparing it with pay. The current
study does not allow us to disentangle these two scenarios.
Secondly, age was not collected as a demographic variable. There is a lack of evidence to
suggest that age is a significant determinant of motivation, especially in gig work [11]. Age and
tenure are highly correlated and when controlling for the latter, age is typically not a determi-
nant of pay fairness perceptions [47]. Given the fact that MTurk is an informal marketplace
and does not represent a typical employee-organization relationship, the effect of tenure is
unclear. However, meta-analytic findings from Bal and colleagues suggest age moderates the
relationship between psychological contract breach and attitudinal outcomes, such that as age
increased the negative relationship between contract breach and trust and organizational com-
mitment weakened [48]. MTurk Workers are typically older and more age-diverse than other
convenience samples used for social science research such as undergraduate students [1]. This
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makes age an interesting factor to explore in future research regarding variable expectations of
the working environment and reactions to pay, justice perceptions, and psychological contract
breaches.
Thirdly, the current study makes inferences about low pay on crowdsourced work plat-
forms such as MTurk, but it does not consider the possible undue influence of excessive pay
compared to similar tasks. The Belmont Report which is concerned with the fair treatment of
human subjects states that “undue influence. . .occurs through an offer of an excessive, unwar-
ranted, inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance”
[7]. Though not particularly relevant for the tasks that participants completed in this study,
other research which requires disclosure of socially unacceptable attitudes and behavior should
be particularly concerned about undue influence especially with populations as vulnerable as
underpaid MTurk Workers. Subsequently, future research should focus on the boundary con-
ditions of an appropriate level of pay for social science research with a focus on finding a bal-
ance between exploitation and undue influence.
Despite differences between worker-participants and voluntary or student research partici-
pants, academic Requesters may not view themselves as employers. Nonetheless, they have an
equal ethical obligation to all types of participants which should incorporate unique partici-
pant motivations and expectations and the psychological contract. We have shown that
although the evidence does not suggest pay affects the overall performance of a Worker, it
does affect satisfaction and attrition. We hope to demonstrate that MTurk can be viewed and
understood as a unique workplace, with unique needs in terms of compensation, and
Requester-Worker expectations. Attention toward these characteristics, as with any research
participant population, is one of many critical determinants of retention in longitudinal
research.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Tara S. Behrend, Andrew B. Collmus, Richard N. Landers.
Data curation: Elena M. Auer.
Formal analysis: Elena M. Auer.
Investigation: Andrew B. Collmus.
Methodology: Tara S. Behrend, Andrew B. Collmus, Richard N. Landers.
Visualization: Elena M. Auer, Ahleah F. Miles.
Writing – original draft: Elena M. Auer, Tara S. Behrend, Ahleah F. Miles.
Writing – review & editing: Elena M. Auer, Tara S. Behrend, Andrew B. Collmus, Richard N.
Landers, Ahleah F. Miles.
References
1. Behrend TS, Sharek DJ, Meade AW, Wiebe EN. The viability of crowdsourcing for survey research.
Behav Res Methods. 2011; 43: 800–813. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-011-0081-0 PMID: 21437749
2. Stewart N, Chandler J, Paolacci G. Crowdsourcing samples in cognitive science. Trends Cogn Sci.
2017; 21: 736–748. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.007 PMID: 28803699
3. Buhrmester M, Kwang T, Gosling SD. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet
high-quality, data? Perspect Psychol Sci. 2011; 6: 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980
PMID: 26162106
4. Berinsky AJ, Huber GA, Lenz GS. Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.
com’s Mechanical Turk. Polit Anal. 2012; 20: 351–368. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr057
PLOS ONE Pay for performance, satisfaction and retention in longitudinal crowdsourced research
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460 January 20, 2021 15 / 17
5. Landers RN, Behrend TS. An inconvenient truth: Arbitrary distinctions between organizational, Mechan-
ical Turk, and other convenience samples. Ind Organ Psychol. 2015; 8: 142–164. https://doi.org/10.
1017/iop.2015.13
6. Devine EG, Waters ME, Putnam M, Surprise C, O’Malley K, Richambault C, et al. Concealment and
fabrication by experienced research subjects. Clin Trials. 2013; 10: 935–948. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1740774513492917 PMID: 23867223
7. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
The Belmont report: Ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research.
1979.
8. Gonos G, Martino C. Temp agency workers in New Jersey’s logistics hub: The case for a union hiring
hall. Work J Labor Soc. 2011; 14: 499–525.
9. Johnston H, Land-Kazlauskas C. Organizing on-demand: Representation, voice, and collective bar-
gaining in the gig economy. Geneva: International Labour Organization; 2018.
10. Bartley T, Roberts WT. Relational exploitation: The informal organization of day labor agencies. Workin-
gUSA. 2006; 9: 41–58.
11. Latham GP, Pinder CC. Work motivation theory and research at the dawn of the twenty-first century.
Annu Rev Psychol. 2005; 56: 485–516. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142105
PMID: 15709944
12. Locke EA, Feren DB, McCaleb VM, Shaw KN, Denny AT. The relative effectiveness of four methods of
motivating employee performance. In: Duncan KD, Gruenberg MM, Wallis D, editors. Changes in Work-
ing Life. New York: Wiley; 1980. pp. 363–388.
13. Litman L, Robinson J, Rosenzweig C. The relationship between motivation, monetary compensation,
and data quality among US- and India-based workers on Mechanical Turk. Behav Res Methods. 2015;
47: 519–528. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-014-0483-x PMID: 24907001
14. Burleigh T. 1/5 What’s a fair payment on #MTurk? I was curious what MTurk workers would say to this,
so I paid ~200 workers 5 cents to answer a single question: “What is fair payment on MTurk to you?”
2019. Available: https://twitter.com/tylerburleigh/status/1157676430211391489.
15. Lawler EE 3rd. Pay and organizational effectiveness: A psychological view. New York: McGraw Hill;
1971.
16. DeShon RP, Gillespie JZ. A motivated action theory account of goal orientation. J Appl Psychol. 2005;
90: 1096–1127. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.90.6.1096 PMID: 16316268
17. Condly SJ, Clark RE, Stolovitch HD. The effects of incentives on workplace performance: A meta-ana-
lytic review of research studies. Perform Improv Q. 2003; 16: 44–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-
8327.2003.tb00287.x
18. Judge TA, Piccolo RF, Podsakoff NP, Shaw JC, Rich BL. The relationship between pay and job satis-
faction: A meta-analysis of the literature. J Vocat Behav. 2010; 77: 157–167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jvb.2010.04.002
19. Tekleab AG, Bartol KM, Liu W. Is it pay levels or pay raises that matter to fairness and turnover? J
Organ Behav. 2005; 26: 899–921. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.352
20. Rousseau DM. Psychological contracts in organizations: Understanding written and unwritten agree-
ments. SAGE Publications; 1995. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452231594
21. Rousseau DM. Schema, promise and mutuality: The building blocks of the psychological contract. J
Occup Organ Psychol. 2001; 74: 511–541. https://doi.org/10.1348/096317901167505
22. Dabos GE, Rousseau DM. Mutuality and reciprocity in the psychological contracts of employees and
employers. J Appl Psychol. 2004; 89: 52–72. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.1.52 PMID:
14769120
23. Levanthal GS. The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and organizations. Vol. 9. In: Berko-
witz L, Walster W, editors. Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol. 9. New York: Academic
Press; 1976. pp. 91–131.
24. Colquitt JA, Zipay KP. Justice, fairness, and employee reactions. Annu Rev Organ Psychol Organ
Behav. 2015; 2: 75–99.
25. Folger R, Greenberg J. Procedural justice: An interpretive analysis of personnel systems. Res Pers
Hum Resour Manag. 1985; 3: 141–183.
26. Colquitt JA. On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of a measure. J Appl
Psychol. 2001; 86: 386–400. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.386 PMID: 11419799
27. Irani LC, Silberman MS. Turkopticon: Interrupting worker invisibility in Amazon Mechanical Turk. Pro-
ceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 2013. pp. 611–620.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2470654.2470742
PLOS ONE Pay for performance, satisfaction and retention in longitudinal crowdsourced research
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460 January 20, 2021 16 / 17
28. Salehi N, Irani LC, Bernstein MS, Alkhatib A, Ogbe E, Milland K, et al. We are dynamo: Overcoming
stalling and friction in collective action for crowd workers. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. 2015. pp. 1621–1630. https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.
2702508
29. Blau G, Boal K. Using job involvement and organizational commitment interactively to predict turnover.
J Manage. 1989; 15: 115–127. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920638901500110
30. Hom PW, Katerberg R, Hulin CL. Comparative examination of three approaches to the prediction of
turnover. J Appl Psychol. 1979; 64: 280–290. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.64.3.280
31. Mitchell TR, Holtom BC, Lee TW, Sablynski CJ, Erez M. Why people stay: Using job embeddedness to
predict voluntary turnover. Acad Manag J. 2001; 44: 1102–1121. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069391
32. Griffeth RW, Hom PW, Gaertner S. A meta-analysis of antecedents and correlates of employee turn-
over: Update, moderator tests, and research implications for the next millennium. J Manage. 2000; 26:
463–488. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920630002600305
33. Donnellan MB, Oswald FL, Baird BM, Lucas RE. The Mini-IPIP scales: Tiny-yet-effective measures of
the Big Five factors of personality. Psychol Assess. 2006; 18: 192–203. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-
3590.18.2.192 PMID: 16768595
34. Watson D, Clark LA, Tellegen A. Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative
Affect: The PANAS scales. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1988; 54: 1063–1070. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.54.6.1063 PMID: 3397865
35. Raven J. The Raven Progressive Matrices: A review of national norming studies and ethnic and socio-
economic variation within the United States. J Educ Meas. 1989; 26: 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1745-3984.1989.tb00314.x
36. Tankersley D, Stowe CJ, Huettel SA. Altruism is associated with an increased neural response to
agency. Nat Neurosci. 2007; 10: 150–151. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1833 PMID: 17237779
37. Judge TA, Hulin CL. Job satisfaction as a reflection of disposition: A multiple source causal analysis.
Organ Behav Hum Decis Process. 1993; 56: 388–421. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1993.1061
38. Bruine De Bruin W, Parker AM, Fischhoff B. Individual differences in adult decision-making compe-
tence. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2007; 92: 938–956. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.938 PMID:
17484614
39. Ryan RM. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: An extension of cognitive evaluation the-
ory. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1982; 43: 450–461. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.43.3.450
40. Desimone JA, Harms PD, Desimone AJ. Best practice recommendations for data screening. J Organ
Behav. 2015; 36: 171–181. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1962
41. Meade AW, Craig SB. Identifying careless responses in survey data. Psychol Methods. 2012; 17: 437–
455. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028085 PMID: 22506584
42. Fox J. Dummy-Variable Regression. In: Fox J. Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Linear
Models. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications; 2015. pp. 120–142.
43. Horton JJ, Chilton LB. The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing. Proceedings of the ACM Confer-
ence on Electronic Commerce. 2010. pp. 209–218. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807376
44. Hara K, Adams A, Milland K, Savage S, Callison-Burch C, Bigham JP. A data-driven analysis of work-
ers’ earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3174023
45. Helson H. Adaptation-level as frame of reference for prediction of psychophysical data. Am J Psychol.
1947; 60: 1–29. https://doi.org/10.2307/1417326 PMID: 20288861
46. Lucas RE, Clark AE, Georgellis Y, Diener E. Reexamining adaptation and the set point model of happi-
ness: Reactions to changes in marital status. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2003; 84: 527–539. https://doi.org/
10.1037//0022-3514.84.3.527 PMID: 12635914
47. Dornstein M. The fairness judgments of received pay and their determinants. J Occup Psychol. 1989;
62: 287–299.
48. Bal PM, De Lange AH, Jansen PG, Van Der Velde ME. Psychological contract breach and job attitudes:
A meta-analysis of age as a moderator. J Vocat Behav. 2008; 72: 143–158.
PLOS ONE Pay for performance, satisfaction and retention in longitudinal crowdsourced research
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245460 January 20, 2021 17 / 17
